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Summary 
Over the past several years, the Chinese government has maintained a policy of intervening in 
currency markets to limit or halt the appreciation of its currency, the renminbi (RMB) against 
other major currencies, especially the U.S. dollar. This policy appears to be largely intended to 
keep China’s export industries competitive internationally and to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI), which have been major factors behind China’s rapid economic growth. Critics charge that 
this policy constitutes a form of currency manipulation that is intended to make Chinese exports 
cheaper, and imports into China more expensive, than they would be under a floating exchange 
system. Some claim that China’s currency policy is a major cause of the large U.S. trade 
imbalance with China and the loss of numerous U.S. jobs. Many Members of Congress have 
urged the Obama Administration to designate China as a “currency manipulator” in order to 
pressure it to let the RMB appreciate, and several bills have been introduced (including H.R. 
2378, S. 1254, S. 1027, and S. 3134) which seek to address China’s currency policy. On 
September 29, 2010, the House approved an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 2378 
(by a vote of 348 to 79). The bill would attempt to apply U.S. countervailing laws to certain 
fundamentally undervalued currencies. 
From July 2005 to July 2008, the RMB was allowed to gradually appreciate against the dollar, 
rising by about 21% over this period. However, once the effects of the global economic crisis 
began to become apparent, China halted appreciation of the RMB to the dollar in an effort to limit 
job losses in industries dependent on trade. From July 2008 to late June 2010, China kept the 
exchange rate of the RMB at roughly 6.83 yuan (the base unit of the RMB) to the dollar. On June 
19, 2010, the Chinese central bank stated that, based on current economic conditions, it had 
decided to “proceed further with reform of the RMB exchange rate regime and to enhance the 
RMB exchange rate flexibility.” Events following the announcement demonstrate that a flexible 
RMB exchange rate could move both up and down over short periods of time. By September 23, 
the RMB had appreciated by about 1.9% to 6.7 yuan. Many U.S. officials have criticized the slow 
pace of RMB’s appreciation. 
Many economists have argued that RMB appreciation is an important factor in helping to 
rebalance the world economy. They have also urged China to implement policies to make 
consumer demand, rather than exports and fixed investment, the main sources of economic 
growth. Some see RMB appreciation as a way of boosting China’s imports, which could 
contribute to a faster global economic recovery. While Chinese officials acknowledge the need to 
rebalance the economy, they have strongly resisted international pressure to appreciate and 
reform the currency, calling it “protectionism.” Some attribute this policy to concerns by the 
Chinese government that implementing policy changes too rapidly could lead to social instability. 
While the Obama Administration has pushed China to appreciate its currency, it has also 
encouraged it to continue purchasing U.S. Treasury securities. China is the largest foreign holder 
of U.S. Treasury securities, which totaled $847 billion as of July 2010. Some analysts contend 
that, although an appreciation of China’s currency could help boost U.S. exports to China, it 
could also lessen China’s need to buy U.S. Treasury securities, which could push up U.S. interest 
rates. It could result in higher prices of Chinese-made goods for U.S. consumers, as well as for 
Chinese-made inputs that U.S. firms use in their production. Many economists contend that, even 
if China significantly appreciated its currency, the United States would still need to increase its 
savings and reduce domestic demand (particularly the budget deficit), and China would have to 
lower its savings and increase consumption, in order to reduce trade imbalances in the long run. 
Congressional Research Service 
China’s Currency: An Analysis of the Economic Issues 
Contents 
Introduction 1 
Historical Background on China’s Currency 2 
2005: China Reforms the Peg 2 
Recent RMB Developments 4 
Overview of the Debate Over China’s Currency Policy: U.S. and Chinese 
Perspectives 5 
Concerns in the United States: Trade Deficits and Jobs 5 
U.S. Legislative Proposals 9 
China’s Perspective and Concerns: Economic Growth and Stability 10 
An Economic Analysis of the China Currency Issue 12 
Is the RMB Undervalued, and if so, by How Much? 12 
Why do Estimates of the RMB’s Undervaluation Differ so Much? 13 
The Debate over the Effects of Exchange Rate Appreciation on Trade Flows and the 
Deficit 15 
The Bilateral Trade Deficit Continued to Grow during the Previous Period of 
RMB Appreciation 15 
The J Curve Effect 16 
The Role of Exchange Rate Pass-Through 16 
China’s Role in the Global Supply Chain 17 
Underlying Macroeconomic Imbalances Are Unlikely to Disappear 17 
Differing Opinions on Making RMB Appreciation a Top U.S. Trade Priority 17 
Winners and Losers of RMB Appreciation from an Economic Perspective 18 
Effect on U.S Exporters and Import-Competitors 19 
Effect on U.S. Consumers and Certain Producers 19 
Effect on U.S. Borrowers 19 
Net Effect on the U.S. Economy 20 
The Effects of an Undervalued RMB on China’s Economy 21 
Policy Options for the RMB and Potential Outcomes 23 
Current Account Balances, Savings, and Investment 26 
Sources of Economic Growth 30 
Investment and Consumption Relative to GDP 31 
Figures 
Figure 1. Nominal RMB/Dollar Exchange Rate: January 2008 to June 2010 3 
Figure 2. Change in China’s Real Trade Weighted Exchange Rate: July 2008-August 
2010 4 
Figure 3. The Yuan-Dollar Exchange Rate: June 18-October 1, 2010 5 
Figure 4. China’s Current Account Balance and Annual Change in Foreign Exchange 
Reserves: 2001-2009 7 
Figure 5. China’s Monthly Trade Flows: January 2008-July 2010 12 
Figure A-1. Chinese and U.S. Current Account Balances: 2000-2009 27 
Congressional Research Service 
China’s Currency: An Analysis of the Economic Issues 
Figure A-2. Chinese and U.S. Current Account Balances as a Percent of GDP: 2000-2009 28 
Figure A-3. Gross National Savings as a Percent of GDP for China and the United States: 
1990-2009 29 
Figure A-4. U.S. Real GDP Growth and Sources of GDP Growth: 2003-2009 30 
Figure A-5. Chinese Real GDP Growth and Sources of GDP Growth 31 
Figure A-6. Gross Investment as a Percent of GDP for Selected Economies: 2008 32 
Figure A-7. Private Consumption as a Percent of GDP for Selected Economies: 2008 32 
Figure A-8.Annual Growth in Real Chinese and U.S. Private Consumption: 2000-2009 33 
Tables 
Table A-1. Ratio of Gross National Savings to Gross Investment and Current Account 
Balances as a Percent of GDP for Various Economies: 2008 26 
Appendixes 
Appendix. Indicators of U.S. and Chinese Economic Imbalances 25 
Contacts 
Author Contact Information 33 
Congressional Research Service 
China’s Currency: An Analysis of the Economic Issues 
Introduction 
China’s policy of intervention to limit the appreciation of its currency, the renminbi (RMB), or 
yuan, against the dollar and other currencies has become a major source of tension with many of 
its trading partners, especially the United States.1 Some analysts contend that China deliberately 
“manipulates” its currency in order to gain unfair trade advantages over its trading partners. They 
further argue that China’s undervalued currency has been a major factor in the large annual U.S. 
trade deficits with China and the loss of millions of U.S. manufacturing jobs, and, because of the 
current high rate of U.S. unemployment, can no longer be tolerated. President Obama stated in 
February 2010 that China’s undervalued currency puts U.S. firms at a “huge competitive 
disadvantage,” and he pledged to make addressing China’s currency policy a top priority. 
Chinese officials have maintained that China’s currency policies are intended to promote 
economic stability and do not negatively impact other countries. From July 2005 to July 2008, 
China allowed the RMB to gradually appreciate against the dollar. However, once the effects of 
the global economic crisis became apparent, the appreciation of the RMB was halted and the 
exchange rate with the dollar was held constant at 6.83 yuan. This move was criticized by many 
of China’s major trading partners, including the United States and the European Union. China 
responded by calling the growing international pressure on China to appreciate its currency 
“protectionism.” However, on June 19, 2010, the People’s Bank of China stated that, based on 
current economic conditions, it had decided to “proceed further with reform of the RMB 
exchange rate regime and to enhance the RMB exchange rate flexibility.” 
The pace of the yuan’s appreciation since that announcement has been criticized as being too 
slow. On September 29, 2010, the House passed an amended version of H.R. 2378, which would 
attempt to treat a fundamentally undervalued currency as a subsidy under U.S. countervailing 
laws. 
Although economists differ as to the extent of the RMB’s undervaluation against the dollar and 
the economic effects that undervaluation has on China’s major trading partners, including the 
United States (many cite both positive and negative effects), most agree that currency flexibility 
would be an important factor in helping to reduce global imbalances, which are believed to have 
been a major factor that sparked the global financial crisis and economic slowdown. They further 
contend that currency reform is in China’s own long-term economic interest. However, many 
economists argue that a Chinese currency appreciation will do little to reduce trade imbalances in 
the United States and China unless such action is accompanied by changes to U.S. and Chinese 
macroeconomic practices (i.e., the United States would need to save more and consume less and 
China would need to save less and consume more), which could lower overall U.S. imports 
(including from China) and boost China’s overall imports (including from the United States). In 
addition, some analysts contend that Chinese industrial policies pose a much greater challenge to 
U.S. economic interests than an undervalued currency. 
This report provides an overview of the economic issues surrounding the current debate over 
China’s currency policy. It identifies the economic costs and benefits of China’s currency policy 
for both China and the United States, and possible implications if China were to allow its 
1The official name of China’s currency is the renminbi (RMB), which is denominated in yuan units. Both RMB and 
yuan are used interchangeably to describe China’s currency. 
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currency to significantly appreciate or to float freely. It also examines proposed legislation in the 
111th Congress that seek to address China’s currency policy. 
Historical Background on China’s Currency 
Prior to 1994, China maintained a dual exchange rate system. This consisted of an official fixed 
exchange rate system (which was used by the government), and a relatively market-based 
exchange rate system that was used by importers and exporters in “swap markets,” although 
access to foreign exchange was highly restricted in order to limit imports, resulting in a large 
black market for foreign exchange. The two exchange rates differed significantly. The official 
exchange rate with the dollar in 1993 was 5.77 yuan versus 8.70 yuan in the swap markets. 
China’s dual exchange rate system was criticized by the United States because of the restrictions 
it (and other policies) placed on foreign imports. 
In 1994, the Chinese government unified the two exchange rate systems at an initial rate of 8.70 
yuan to the dollar, which eventually was allowed to rise to 8.28 by 1997 and was then kept 
relatively constant until July 2005. The RMB became largely convertible on a current account 
(trade) basis, but not on a capital account basis, meaning that yuan are not regularly obtainable for 
investment purposes. From 1994 until July 2005, China maintained a policy of pegging the RMB 
to the U.S. dollar at an exchange rate of roughly 8.28 yuan to the dollar. The peg appears to have 
been largely intended to promote a relatively stable environment for foreign trade and investment 
in China (since such a policy prevents large swings in exchange rates)—a policy utilized by many 
developing countries in their early development stages. The Chinese central bank maintained this 
peg by buying (or selling) as many dollar-denominated assets in exchange for newly printed yuan 
as needed to eliminate excess demand (supply) for the yuan. As a result, the exchange rate 
between the RMB and the dollar basically stayed the same, despite changing economic factors 
which could have otherwise caused the yuan to appreciate (or depreciate) relative to the dollar. 
Under a floating exchange rate system, the relative demand for the two countries’ goods and 
assets would determine the exchange rate of the RMB to the dollar. 
2005: China Reforms the Peg 
The Chinese government modified its currency policy on July 21, 2005. It announced that the 
yuan’s exchange rate would become “adjustable, based on market supply and demand with 
reference to exchange rate movements of currencies in a basket,”2 and that the exchange rate of 
the U.S. dollar against the RMB was adjusted from 8.28 yuan to 8.11, an appreciation of 2.1%. 
Unlike a true floating exchange rate, the RMB would be allowed to fluctuate by up to 0.3% (later 
changed to 0.5%) on a daily basis against the basket. 
After July 2005, China allowed the RMB to appreciate steadily, but very slowly. From July 21, 
2005 to July 21, 2008, the dollar-RMB exchange rate went from 8.11 to 6.83, an appreciation of 
18.7% (or 20.8% if the initial 2.1% appreciation of the RMB to the dollar is included). The 
2
 It was later announced that the composition of the basket would include the dollar, the yen, the euro, and a few other 
currencies, although the currency composition of the basket has never been revealed. If the value of the yuan were 
determined according to a basket of currencies, however, it would not have shown the stability it has had against the 
dollar between mid-2008 and mid-2010, unless the basket were overwhelmingly weighted toward dollars. 
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situation at this time might be best described as a “managed float”—market forces determined the 
general direction of the RMB’s movement, but the government retarded its rate of appreciation 
through market intervention. China halted its currency appreciation policy around mid-July 2008 
(see Figure 1) mainly because of sharp decline global demand for Chinese products that resulted 
from the effects of the global financial crisis. The RMB depreciated against the dollar slightly in 
July-August 2008 and in December 2008, but generally was kept constant at 6.83 yuan for every 
month through around mid-June 2010. 
Figure 1. Nominal RMB/Dollar Exchange Rate: January 2008 to June 2010 
Yuan per $U.S. (Monthly Averages) 
Source: Global Insight and the Bank of China “middle rate.” 
Note: Chart inverted for illustrative purposes. A rising line indicates appreciation of the RMB to the dollar and a 
falling line indicates depreciation. 
China’s relative peg to the dollar after July 2008 has meant that as the dollar depreciated or 
appreciated against a number of major currencies, China’s currency depreciated or appreciated as 
well (even though the RMB’s exchange rate with the dollar remained constant). From July 2008 
to through May 2010, the real (inflation adjusted) trade-weighted exchange rate of China’s 
currency based on its trade with 57 economies appreciated by 8.9%. Although China’s real trade-
weighted exchange rate depreciated through much of 2009, it began to rise in 2010, due in part to 
the effects of the debt crisis in the Eurozone countries and the depreciation of the euro to the 
dollar (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Change in China’s Real Trade Weighted Exchange Rate: July 2008-August 
2010 
Index Based on Average Annual 2005 Data (2005=100) 
Source: Bank of International Settlements. 
Note: Weights calculated based on China’s trade with 57 economies. Inflation calculated using measurements of 
national consumer price indexes. 
Recent RMB Developments 
Chinese leaders have expressed strong opposition to outside pressure on their currency policy, 
calling it a form of protectionism and interference in China’s domestic economic policy, and 
some have even questioned whether the currency is undervalued at all. However, on June 19, 
2010, the Chinese central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) stated that, based on current 
economic conditions, it had decided to “proceed further with reform of the RMB exchange rate 
regime and to enhance the RMB exchange rate flexibility.” It ruled out any large one-time 
revaluations, stating “it is important to avoid any sharp and massive fluctuations of the RMB 
exchange rate,” in part so that Chinese corporations could more easily adjust (such as through 
upgrading) to an appreciation of the currency. Many observers contend the timing of the RMB 
announcement was intended in part to prevent China’s currency policy from being a central focus 
of the G-20 summit in Toronto from June 26-27, 2010. 
On June 22, 2010, the RMB appreciated by 0.43% against the dollar (to 6.80 yuan) over the 
previous day, which, at the time, was the largest daily rise since reforms were implemented in 
July 2005. However, on the following day (June 23) it depreciated to 6.81 yuan. As indicated in 
Figure 3, the yuan’s exchange rate with the dollar has gone up and down over the past few 
months, but overall, it has appreciated by 1.9% through October 1, 2010, with most of that 
appreciation occurring in September. 3 Some analysts contend that the appreciation of the 
3
 The fact that the currency has appreciated some days but has depreciated on others raises a number of questions as to 
(continued...) 
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currency in September 2010 has had more to do with Chinese concerns over possible 
congressional action on the currency than economic considerations.4 
Figure 3. The Yuan-Dollar Exchange Rate: June 18-October 1, 2010 
Yuan per U.S. dollar 
Source: Bank of China 
Notes: End of week (Friday) middle exchange rate. Chart inverted for illustrative purposes. 
Overview of the Debate Over China’s Currency Policy: U.S. and 
Chinese Perspectives 
Concerns in the United States: Trade Deficits and Jobs 
Many U.S. policymakers and business and labor representatives have charged that the Chinese 
government manipulates its currency in order to make it significantly undervalued vis-à-vis the 
U.S. dollar, thus making Chinese exports to the United States significantly cheaper, and U.S. 
exports to China much more expensive, than they would be if exchange rates were determined by 
market forces. They note that, while a pegged currency may have been appropriate during China’s 
(...continued) 
the extent and pace the PBC will allow the RMB to appreciate over time. Many observers believe that this is a sign that 
appreciation of the RMB will happen over a long period of time, but in an unpredictable way in an effort to limit RMB 
speculation and inflows of “hot money,” which could destabilize the economy. 
4
 The House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Banking Committee both had hearings on China’s 
currency in September 2010. 
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early stages of economic development, it can no longer be justified, given the size of China’s 
economy and trade flows and the impact China’s economic policies have on the global economy.5 
Critics further argue that the undervalued currency has been a major factor behind the burgeoning 
U.S. trade deficit with China, which surged from $10 billion in 1990 to $266 billion in 2008 (but 
declined to $226 billion in 2009). Other factors viewed by some as evidence of Chinese currency 
manipulation are China’s massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, which grew from 
$403 billion in 2003 to $2,454 billion as of June 2010 and its large annual current account 
surpluses, which grew from $46 billion in 2003 in $426 billion in 2008 (although the surplus in 
2009 fell significantly) (see Figure 4). In a July 2010 report, the IMF warned that, over the 
medium-term, there was potential for sizable current account surpluses to return as China’s policy 
stimulus is wound down and the global economy recovers.6 The IMF’s April 2010 World 
Economic Outlook projects that China’s current account will rise from $284 billion in 2009 to 
$335 billion in 2010, and by the year 2015, it will increase to $418 billion.7 Global Insight 
predicts that China’s foreign exchange reserves will increase to $3,194 billion, which would be an 
increase of $740 billion over June 2010 levels.8 
Some analysts contend that there is a direct correlation between the U.S. trade deficit and U.S. job 
losses, especially in the manufacturing center. For example, a study by the Economic Policy 
Institute claims that the U.S. trade deficit with China led to the loss or displacement of 2.4 million 
manufacturing jobs between 2001 and 2008.9 The current high rate of unemployment in the 
United States appears to have intensified concerns over the perceived economic impact of China’s 
currency policy. Furthermore, some analysts contend that China’s currency policy induces other 
East Asian economies to intervene in currency markets in order to keep their currencies weak 
against the dollar in order to compete with Chinese goods, which is viewed as preventing further 
depreciation of the dollar to other Asian currencies, and thus diminishes U.S. exports throughout 
Asia. Based on the assumption that China’s currency is undervalued by at least 40% against the 
dollar and 25% on a trade weighted basis, C. Fred Bergsten from the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics estimates that a market-based Chinese currency would result in a large 
appreciation of the RMB and other Asian currencies against the dollar (or in other words a 
depreciation of the dollar to Asian currencies), which would boost U.S. exports and generate an 
additional 600,000 to 1.2 million jobs in the United States.10 U.S. economist Paul Krugman 
contends that the undervalued RMB has become a significant drag on global economic recovery, 
estimating that it has lowered global GDP by 1.4%, and has especially hurt poor countries.11 
5
 China became the world’s second largest merchandise exporter in 2009 (after the European Union) and accounted for 
9.5% of global exports. China is also estimated to be the world’s second largest economy. 
6
 IMF, People’s Republic of China: 2010 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Public Information 
Notice on the Executive Board Discussion, July 2010, p. 1. 
7
 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. 
8
 These accumulations occur even with a forecast of the yuan-dollar exchange rate to rise at 5.68 by 2015. Source: 
Global Insight, China, Detailed Forecast, Balance of Payments, August 12, 2010. 
9
 Economic Policy Institute, Unfair China Trade Costs Local Jobs 2.4 Million Jobs Lost, Thousands Displaced in 
Every U.S. Congressional District, Briefing Paper #260, March 23, 2010, available at http://epi.3cdn.net/ 
91b2eeeffce66c1a10_v5m6beqhi.pdf. 
10
 C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Testimony before the Committee on Ways and 
Means, US House of Representatives, March 24, 2010. However, in testimony to the House Committee on Ways and 
Means on September 15, 2010, Bergsten stated that “elimination of the Chinese misalignment would create about half a 
million US jobs.” See testimony at: http://www.iie.com/publications/testimony/bergsten20100915.pdf. 
11
 New York Times, March 14, 2010 and December 31, 2009. Krugman also estimates that China’s currency policy has 
(continued...) 
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Claims about the negative effect of China’s exchange rate on U.S. employment and trade are 
often juxtaposed with the observation that China’s economy grew more rapidly than any 
advanced economy from 2007 to 2009, averaging 10.4% per year.12 This has led some 
commentators to complain that China’s exchange rate peg represents a “beggar thy neighbor” 
policy at a time of global economic crisis. (The validity of claims about the RMB’s effect on the 
U.S. economy will be analyzed in the section below entitled “An Economic Analysis of the China 
Currency Issue.”) 
Figure 4. China’s Current Account Balance and Annual Change in Foreign Exchange 
Reserves: 2001-2009 
$billions 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit and Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange. 
Note: Year end values. 
(...continued) 
caused 1.4 million job losses in the United States. 
12
 Based on data from the International Monetary Fund. 
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Is China a “Currency Manipulator?” 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury is required on a biannual basis to issue a Report to Congress on International 
Economic and Exchange Rate Policies of major U.S. trading partners,13 and to “consider whether countries manipulate 
the rate of exchange between their currency and the United States dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance 
of payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade.”14 If such manipulation is 
found to exist with respect to countries that have material global current account surpluses and have significant 
bilateral trade surpluses with the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury is directed to initiate negotiations with 
such countries on an expedited basis in the International Monetary Fund or bilaterally, for the purpose of ensuring 
that such countries regularly and promptly adjust the rate of exchange between their currencies and the U.S. dollar to 
permit effective balance of payments adjustments and to eliminate the unfair advantage. China was cited as a currency 
manipulator five times by Treasury from May 1992 and July 1994 over such issues as its dual exchange rate system, 
periods of currency devaluation, restrictions on imports, and lack of access to foreign exchange by importers. 
Many Members of Congress have expressed frustration that Treasury has not cited China as a currency manipulator 
in recent years.15 Observers note that the language in the statute is somewhat unclear as to what policies constitute 
actual currency manipulation (and the extent of Treasury’s discretion to make such a determination). A 2005 
Treasury Department report stated that such a determination under the guiding statute was “inherently difficult” 
because of the interplay of macroeconomic and microeconomic forces throughout the world, but said that such a 
designation could be made if the authorities of an economy “intentionally act to set the exchange rate at levels, or 
ranges, such that for a protracted period the exchange rate differs significantly from the rate that would have 
prevailed in the absence of action by the authorities.”16 A 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on 
the Treasury Department’s currency reports stated that in order for Treasury to reach a positive determination of 
currency manipulation, a country would have to have a material global current account surplus and a significant 
bilateral trade surplus with the United States, and would have to be manipulating its currency with the “intent” of 
gaining a trade advantage. Some observers contend that Treasury will not cite China as a currency manipulator 
because it can not prove that China’s currency policy is “intended” to give it an unfair trade advantage, since Chinese 
government intervention in currency markets attempts to slow or halt the appreciation of the RMB (as opposed to 
sharply depreciating the RMB). Other observers contend that as long as China continues to take steps to make its 
currency more flexible, Treasury will refrain from citing China. A third theory states that citing China as a currency 
manipulator would have no practical effect (especially since China and the United States are already engaged on this 
issue at the highest government level) other than to “name and shame,” a policy that could anger the Chinese 
government without producing any concrete results. However, some U.S. policy analysts and Members of Congress 
have strongly urged the Treasury Department to designate China as a currency manipulator in order to “name and 
shame it.” By doing so, it is argued, the United States would be sending a message that it was no longer willing to 
tolerate China’s currency policy and it could encourage other countries to rally behind the U.S. position (including 
within the International Monetary Fund which exercises surveillance of its members currency policy), and could 
possibly lead to multilateral meeting/agreement on global exchange rate realignment.17 Several bills have been 
introduced in Congress over the past few years that would attempt to limit the Treasury Department’s discretion in 
taking action on undervalued currencies by requiring it to indentify certain misaligned currencies based on a specific 
criteria, regardless of intent of the currency policy. 
13
 As required under Section 3004 of Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (22 U.S.C 5305). 
14
 This language appears to have been taken from Article IV, Section 1 (iii) of the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) which states that members should, among other things “avoid manipulating 
exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to 
gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members.” 
15
 Many Members sharply criticized the Department of the Treasury’s decision in April 2010 to delay issuing its first 
2010 exchange rate report (usually issued in March or April). That report was issued on July 8, 2010 (after China made 
its announcement on currency reform) and it did not cite China (or any other country) for currency manipulation. 
16
 U.S. Department of Treasury, Semiannual Report on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies, Appendix: 
Analysis of Exchange Rates Pursuant to the Act, November 2005. 
17
 Testimony by C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute of International Economics, Correcting the Chinese Exchange 
Rate: an Action Plan, before the House Ways & Means Committee, March 24, 2010. 
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U.S. Legislative Proposals 
Numerous bills have been introduced in Congress over the past few years that would seek to 
induce China to reform its currency policy or would attempt to address the perceived effects that 
policy has on the U.S. economy. For example, one bill introduced in the 108th Congress by 
Senator Schumer (S. 1586) sought to impose additional duties of 27.5% on imported Chinese 
products if China did not appreciate its currency to near market levels.18 
In the 111th Congress, currency bills include H.R. 2378 (Tim Ryan), S. 1027 (Stabenow), S. 1254 
(Schumer), and S. 3134 (Schumer). These bills would seek to address the effects of misaligned 
currencies in the following ways: 
• S. 1254 and S. 3134 would redefine the criteria under which a country would be 
cited for possible action in the Treasury Department’s biannual reports on 
exchange rates. Rather than use the term “manipulation” and the implied criteria 
of “intent” to gain an unfair trade advantage, the bills would instead require the 
Treasury Department to identify “fundamentally misaligned currencies.” 
• All four bills make references to currencies that are fundamentally misaligned 
according to specified indicators and methodologies, which would trigger certain 
actions. Each bill specifies how currency misalignment is to be determined. 
• S. 1254 and S. 3134 would, under certain circumstances, mandate a number of 
other actions in regards to countries whose currencies were identified for priority 
action, including a ban on their participation in federal government procurement 
(unless the country is a member of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on 
Public Procurement or for loan programs administered by the U.S. Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).19 In addition, U.S. executive directors at 
multilateral banks would be required to oppose the approval of new loans of the 
targeted country, and U.S. officials would be directed to request action in the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
• All four bills require that currency misalignment be used as a factor for the 
purposes of U.S. anti-dumping investigations and the calculation of anti-dumping 
duties for imported products determined to be sold at less than fair market value 
and injure a U.S. industry. H.R. 2378 and S. 1027 also require currency 
misalignment to be used as a factor in U.S. countervailing investigations 
(involving government subsidies) and the calculation of countervailing duties for 
imported products that are determined to injure a U.S. industry.20 S. 3134 would 
require the Commerce Department to investigate and determine whether currency 
undervaluation is providing, either directly or indirectly, a subsidy that is already 
applicable under U.S. countervailing laws. 
18
 The sponsors of the bill at that time arrived at the 27.5% tariff figure by taking a simple average of the range of 
estimates of China’s undervaluation, which were listed at 15%-40%. 
19
 OPIC operations in China have been suspended by the United States since 1989 because of the Tiananmen Square 
massacre. 
20
 For an explanation of U.S. trade remedy laws and procedures, see CRS Report RL32371, Trade Remedies: A Primer, 
by Vivian C. Jones. 
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Supporters of provisions that would apply U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing measures to 
address the effects of China’s undervalued currency contend that the WTO allows countries 
(under certain conditions) to administer their own trade remedy laws, and thus, making currency 
undervaluation a factor in determining countervailing or anti-dumping duties is consistent with 
WTO rules. Critics of the bills counter that WTO rules do not specifically include currency 
undervaluation as a factor that can be used to implement trade remedy actions, and thus, such 
legislation, if enacted, would likely be challenged by China and other WTO members as a 
violation of U.S. WTO commitments. 
On September 22, 2010, Congressman Levin announced that the House Ways and Means 
Committee would consider an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 2378. The 
amended version of H.R. 2378 attempts to address concerns by Administration officials and some 
in Congress that the original bill as introduced would not, if enacted, be consistent with WTO 
rules. The Levin bill would amend U.S. trade law to “clarify that countervailing duties may be 
imposed to address subsidies relating to a “fundamentally undervalued currency.” 21 The bill 
would clarify that a fundamentally undervalued currency would be treated as a benefit conferred 
by a foreign government to its exports under U.S. countervailing law. In addition, the bill clarifies 
that “in the case of a subsidy relating to a fundamentally undervalued currency, the fact that the 
subsidy may also be provided in circumstances not involving export shall not, for that reason 
alone, mean that the subsidy cannot be considered contingent upon export performance.”22 The 
bill directs the Commerce Department to use, if possible, data and methodologies used by the 
International Monetary Fund to estimate real effective exchange rate undervaluation. The Ways 
and Means Committee approved the bill by voice vote on September 25, and the House approved 
it on September 29 by a vote of 348 to 79. China responded by calling the bill illegal under WTO 
rules. 
China’s Perspective and Concerns: Economic Growth and Stability 
Chinese officials argue that their currency policy is not meant to favor exports over imports, but 
instead to foster economic stability through currency stability. The policy reflects the 
government’s goals of using exports as a way of providing jobs to Chinese workers and to attract 
FDI in order to gain access to technology and know-how. The Chinese government has stated on 
a number of occasions that currency reform is a long-term goal which will implemented 
gradually. Officials have strongly condemned international pressure to induce China to appreciate 
the currency, arguing that it interferes with China’s “sovereignty” to implement its own domestic 
economic policies. In December 2009, China’s media reported unnamed government officials as 
stating that “it would be difficult to make the case of an immediate renminbi appreciation in a 
country where 40 million people live on less than 1 U.S. dollar a day.”23 It also reported Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao stating that “some countries demand the yuan’s appreciation, while 
21
 The criteria for a fundamentally undervalued currency would include one where the government was engaged (over 
the past 18 months) in protracted, large-scale foreign exchange intervention; the real effective exchange rate is 
undervalued by 5 percent; the country has experienced significant and persistent global current account surpluses; and 
the foreign asset reserves held by the government exceeded certain benchmarks (such as the value of the country’s 
imports during the previous four months). 
22
 A House Ways and Means Committee fact sheet states that the bill would reverse the Commerce Department’s 
practice of finding that an export subsidy is conferred only if the subsidy is not limited exclusively to circumstances of 
export performance. 
23
 Xinhua News Agency, December 1, 2009. 
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practicing various trade protectionism against China. It’s unfair and actually limits China’s 
development.”24 
Despite the government’s pledges on currency reform, some Chinese officials have publicly 
denied that the RMB is undervalued at all and some have even gone as far as to say it is 
overvalued.25 In addition, they have argued that promoting rapid domestic growth, rather than 
appreciating the currency, is the most significant policy China can undertake to promote global 
economic recovery. They note that during the first eight months in 2010, Chinese imports have 
risen by 45.5% over the same period in 2009, compared with a 35.5% rise in exports, and 
monthly surpluses have shrunk significantly from pre-crisis levels (see Figure 5). China’s trade 
surplus from January-August 2010 was down 16.0% over the same period in 2009. In addition, 
China experienced a trade deficit in March 2010, the first such monthly deficit in six years. 
Chinese officials contend that the rapid growth in imports proves that the currency policy does 
not restrict trade or promote Chinese economic growth at the expense of other countries. Critics 
counter that China’s exports have grown rapidly over the past few months and that the trade 
surplus is beginning to pick up as well. 
Chinese officials view economic growth as critical to sustaining political stability, and thus 
appear very reluctant to implement policies that might disrupt the economy and cause widespread 
unemployment, which could cause worker unrest.26 They note that the global financial crisis had 
a significant impact on China’s trade and FDI flows. For example, from January to September 
2008, China enjoyed nearly double-digit growth in monthly exports, imports, and FDI on a year-
on-year basis. However, China’s year-on-year exports and imports dropped for 11 consecutive 
months from November 2008 to October 2009, and FDI declined 9 consecutive months from 
October 2008 to July 2009. For the full year in 2009, Chinese exports, imports, and FDI declined 
by 15.9%, 11.3%, and 2.6%, respectively, over 2008 levels. As a result, thousands of export-
oriented factories reportedly were shut down and over 20 million migrant workers reportedly lost 
their jobs in 2009 because of the direct effects of the global economic slowdown. Although China 
has been able to weather the global economic slowdown through enactment of a $586 billion 
stimulus program and a loose monetary policy, which helped produce real GDP growth of 9.1% 
in 2009, the government remains concerned whether it can continue to effectively manage the 
economy and achieve fast rates of growth in the years ahead. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 See, for example, China Daily, Yuan is Overvalued, not Undervalued: Report, June 17, 2010. 
26
 There have been numerous reports of labor unrest and strikes in different parts of China in 2010, mainly over pay 
issues. Chinese officials are concerned that an appreciation of the RMB could induce Chinese export producers to try to 
hold down wages to remain competitive, or could force them out of business, which could provoke more unrest. 
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Figure 5. China’s Monthly Trade Flows: January 2008-July 2010 
$millions 
Source: Global Trade Atlas using official Chinese statistics. 
An Economic Analysis of the China Currency Issue 
This section examines a number of issues pertaining to the effects of China’s undervalued 
currency on the U.S. and Chinese economies. 
Is the RMB Undervalued, and if so, by How Much? 
Given the rapid increase of China’s exports and FDI inflows from 1994 (when the dollar peg was 
established) through the present time, one would have expected China’s currency to have 
appreciated against the currencies of its major economic and trading partners, including the 
United States, had the RMB exchange rate been determined solely by market forces. To prevent 
appreciation, China has accumulated official foreign reserves equal to $2.5 trillion. The IMF over 
the past few years has stated that the RMB is undervalued, but in February 2010, it stated that the 
RMB was “assessed to be substantially undervalued from a medium-term perspective.”27 
There are numerous estimates of the RMB’s undervaluation against the dollar, although the 
results vary widely depending on the methodologies and various assumptions used.28 Recent 
estimates of the RMB’s undervaluation (and the year the estimate was made) include: 
27
 IMF, Meetings of G-20 Deputies, Seoul, Korea, Global Economic Prospects and Policy Challenges, February 27, 
2010. 
28
 For a survey of methodologies used to estimate a currency’s true value, see CRS Report RL32165, China’s 
Currency: Economic Issues and Options for U.S. Trade Policy, by Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte. 
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• 12% (December 2009) by Helmut Reisen with the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development;29 
• 25% (December 2009) by Dani Rodrik of Harvard University (2009);30 
• 30% (April 2010) by Arvind Subramanian at the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics;31 
• 40.2% (January 2010) 32 and 24.2% (June 2010)33 by William R. Cline and John 
Williamson at the Peterson Institute for International Economics; and 
• 50% (October 2009) by Niall Ferguson (Harvard University) and Moritz 
Schularick (Free University of Berlin).34 
Why do Estimates of the RMB’s Undervaluation Differ so Much? 
There are two main methods used in the estimates presented above. One method is referred to as 
the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) method. It is based on the belief that current 
account balances around the world are temporarily out of line with their “fundamental” value. 
Once an estimate has been made of what the fundamental current account balance should be, one 
can calculate how much the exchange rate must change in value to achieve that current account 
adjustment. To calculate the level of misevaluation for one country under this method, estimates 
of how far exchange rates for every country are out of equilibrium, including countries with 
floating exchange rates, must be made. 
The main source of contention in FEER estimates is choosing an “equilibrium” current account 
balance for each country. Estimates of the RMB’s undervaluation are typically defined as the 
appreciation that would be required for China to attain “equilibrium” in its current account 
balance. But there is no consensus based on theory or evidence to determine what equilibrium 
would be, so a subjective opinion is used.35 Yet this assumption is crucial—Dunaway et al. 
demonstrate that changing the assumed equilibrium current account balance by 2 percentage 
points of GDP changes the estimated undervaluation by as much as 25 percentage points.36 Some 
29
 Reisen, Helmut, On the Renminbi and Economic Convergence, December 17, 2009. Available at 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4397. 
30
 Rodrick, Dani, Making Room for China in the World Economic, December 17, 2009. Available at 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4399. 
31
 Subramani, Arvind, New PPP-Based Estimates of Renminbi Undervaluation and Policy Implications, Peterson 
Institute For International Economics Policy Brief, number PB10-8, April 2010. Available at http://www.iie.com/ 
publications/pb/pb10-08.pdf. 
32
 Cline, William R and John Williamson, Notes on Equilibrium Exchange Rates, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, Policy Brief PB10-2, January 2010, available at http://www.iie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm? 
ResearchID=1472. This study also made estimates of the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate for 29 other countries, 
of which a number of which were estimated to be undervalued while some were deemed to be overvalued. 
33Cline, William R and John Williamson, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, Estimates of Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rates, May 2010, Policy Brief 10-15, June 
2010. Available at http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=1596. 
34
 Harvard Business School, The End of Chimarica, by Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick, Working Paper 10-937, 
October 2009. Available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/10-037.pdf. 
35
 A thorough attempt to estimate exchange rates using this method can be found in John Williamson, ed., Estimating 
Equilibrium Exchange Rates (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994). 
36
 Steven Dunaway et al., “How Robust are Estimates of Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates: The Case of China,” IMF 
(continued...) 
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economists argue that the current account balance would always be close to zero in equilibrium, 
but this neglects the fact that countries with different saving and investment rates may willingly 
and profitably lend to and borrow from one another for long periods of time. If one uses China’s 
neighbors as a reference point, the same combination of large foreign exchange reserves and a 
large current account surplus can be seen in several other countries in the region, even though 
these countries range in their exchange rate regimes from a float (Japan and South Korea) to a 
currency board (Hong Kong). Wang argues that, based on estimates derived from other 
developing economies, China’s equilibrium current account surplus may be even larger than the 
actual surplus, implying by the FEER method that the RMB is overvalued.37 
The other method for estimating the RMB’s undervaluation is based on the theory of purchasing 
power parity (PPP)—the theory that the same good should have the same price in two different 
countries. If it did not, then arbitrageurs could buy it in the cheaper country and sell it in the more 
expensive country until the price disparity disappeared. While PPP is a simple idea that is 
theoretically powerful, it has proven to be unreliable in reality: prices are consistently lower in 
developing countries than industrialized countries, for example. Some economists have tried to 
estimate what the RMB’s value would be by attempting to control for predictable divergences 
from PPP. Still, these estimates should be considered with caution—even when sophisticated 
modifications have been made, PPP has been shown to help predict exchange rates only over the 
long run. Estimates based on PPP would identify any country’s currency as overvalued or 
undervalued relative to the country to which it is being compared, regardless of whether the 
exchange rate is fixed or floating. Another drawback to the PPP approach is that the estimate will 
not tend to change much over time (if prices are relatively stable), even if the trade deficit is 
significantly changing.38 
The Treasury Department’s December 2006 report to Congress on exchange rates discusses the 
use of economic models and methodology to estimate a currency’s “misalignment” or what the 
fair market rate exchange rate should be. The report noted that there is no single model that 
accurately explains exchange rate movements, that such models rarely, if ever, incorporate 
financial market flows, and that their conclusions can vary considerably, based on the variables 
used. However, the Treasury Department stated that examining such models can produce useful 
information in understanding exchange rate movements if they focus only on serious 
misalignments; use real effective, not bilateral, exchange rates; utilize several different models, 
recognizing that no one model will provide precise answers; focus only on protracted 
misalignments where currency adjustments are not taking place; supplement judgments about 
misalignment with analysis of empirical data, indicators, policies and institutional factors; and 
verify whether there are any market-based reasons for a currency’s misalignment.39 
The two sharply different estimates of the RMB’s undervaluation made by Cline and William in 
2010 are a case in point of the challenges posed by economic models. The authors note that they 
(...continued) 
working paper 06/220, October 2006. 
37
 Tao Wang, “Exchange Rate Dynamics,” in Eswar Prasad, ed., “China’s Growth and Integration into the World 
Economy,” International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper 232, 2004, Ch. 4. 
38
 William Cline and John Williamson, “Estimates of the Equilibrium Exchange Rate of the Renminbi,” paper 
presented at the Conference on China’s Exchange Rate Policy, Peterson Institute, October 12, 2007. 
39
 U.S. Treasury Department, Report on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies, December 2006, 
Appendix II. 
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utilized different methods and assumptions for their two studies, which attempt to determine 
fundamental equilibrium exchange rates (FEERs) for various currencies, including the RMB.40 
For example, they note that the economic data used for their estimates came from the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook on projections of future economic variables (such as GDP growth and 
current account balances). The first study used data from the IMF’s October 2009 Outlook while 
the second used the IMF’s April 2010 Outlook. Using different forecast data thus helped produce 
widely different results. Because there is no universally accepted methodology for determining a 
country’s real market exchange rate, the economic conditions that are used to determine 
“equilibrium” exchange rates change continuously, and since estimates of China’s currency 
valuation differ so significantly, many analysts question their usefulness to U.S. policymakers in 
terms of providing a precise goal for an appreciation of the RMB or for use in trade remedy 
legislation that would seek to offset the benefit conferred by the RMB’s undervaluation, such as 
in U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing measures. 
The Debate over the Effects of Exchange Rate Appreciation on 
Trade Flows and the Deficit 
Many policymakers might expect that if China significantly appreciated its currency, U.S. exports 
to China would rise, imports from China would fall, and the U.S. trade deficit would decline 
within a relatively short period of time. For example, C. Fred Bergsten contends that a market-
based RMB would lower the annual U.S. current account deficit by $100 billion to $150 billion.41 
But the issue of the possible effects of an RMB appreciation on the U.S. economy is complicated 
by the fact that there are short-term and long-term implications of RMB appreciation, and that 
exchange rates are but one of many factors that affect trade flows. Other factors affecting the 
bilateral trade balance are discussed below. 
The Bilateral Trade Deficit Continued to Grow during the Previous Period of 
RMB Appreciation 
To illustrate that exchange rates are only one factor that determine trade flows, one can look at the 
effect of the 21% RMB appreciation of the RMB to the dollar from July 2005 to July 2008 on 
U.S.-China trade flows. On the one hand, during this period U.S. imports from China increased 
by 39%, compared to a 92% increase from 2001 to 2004 (when the exchange rate remained 
constant).42 On the other hand, U.S. exports to China during the 2005-2008 period did not grow 
as fast as during the 2001-2004 period (71% versus 81%).43 Despite the RMB’s appreciation from 
40
 Cline and William define a FEER as “an exchange rate that is expected to be indefinitely sustainable on the basis of 
existing policies. It should therefore be one that is expected to generate a current account surplus or deficit that matches 
the country’s underlying capital flow over the cycle, assuming that the country is pursuing internal balance as well as it 
can and that it is not restricting trade for balance-of-payments reasons.” For China, the authors assume that the 
exchange rate should be one consistent with a Chinese current account surplus of no more than 3% of GDP. 
41
 Correcting the Chinese Exchange Rate: An Action Plan, by C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, Testimony before the Committee on Ways and Means, US House of Representatives, March 24, 2010. 
42
 Some analysts contend that U.S. imports from China grew rapidly from 2001-2004, and slowed from 2005 to 2008, 
not because of the appreciation of the RMB, but because of changes to U.S. consumer demand relating to 
macroeconomic conditions. 
43
 Trade varied from year to year. In 2008, U.S. imports from China rose by 5.1% over the previous year, compared to 
import growth of 11.7% in 2007; however, U.S. exports over this period were up 9.5% in 2008 compared with an 
18.1% rise in 2007. 
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2005 to 2008, the U.S. trade deficit with China still rose by 30.1%, although the overall U.S. 
current account deficit declined by nearly 6%.44 The appreciation of the RMB appears to have 
little effect on China’s overall trade balance from 2005 to 2008. During this time, China’s 
merchandise trade surplus increased from $102 billion to $297 billion, an increase of 191%, and 
China’s current account surplus and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves both increased by 
165% over this period. 
The J Curve Effect 
Part of the problem in attempting to evaluate the effects of the RMB’s appreciation is that it can 
take time (perhaps a few years) before changes in exchange rates are reflected in changes to 
prices of tradable goods and services, and hence result in changes to imports, exports, and trade 
balances. An appreciated RMB could actually worsen the U.S. trade deficit in the short-run if the 
volume (demand) of imports from China did not decline at the same rate that prices increased (the 
so-called J-Curve effect). It would take time for U.S. consumers of higher-priced Chinese 
products to find lower-priced (non-Chinese) products or other alternatives and thus reduce overall 
demand for Chinese imports.45 In addition, there would be a lag time in terms of the effects of an 
appreciated RMB on prices of Chinese products, since prices for many exports are set several 
months ahead of time in contracts. If an appreciated currency lowered prices for U.S. products, it 
could take time for increased Chinese demand to be signaled to U.S. producers and exporters and 
for them to boost production to meet the new demand. Over time, one would expect the effects of 
currency appreciation to affect the flow of bilateral trade and, possibly, produce a decrease in the 
bilateral trade imbalance (although the size of the overall U.S. trade deficit might not change 
because that is determined by a number of factors other than exchange rates). 
The Role of Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
Another factor to consider in attempting to evaluate the effects of an RMB appreciation on trade 
flows is to examine how price changes would be passed on or distributed. If the RMB appreciates 
against the dollar, not all of the price increase resulting from the appreciation may be passed on to 
the U.S. consumer. Some of it may be absorbed by Chinese laborers, producers, or exporters, and 
some by U.S. importers, wholesalers, retailers, etc. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, 
from July 2005 to July 2008, the price index for U.S. imports from China from July 2005 to July 
2008, rose by 5.2% (compared to a 13.2% rise in import prices for total U.S. imports of non-
petroleum products).46 This would suggest that very little of the price increase that might have 
resulted from the RMB’s appreciation was passed on to U.S. consumers.47 If prices are not 
completely passed through to consumers, then consumer demand for Chinese imports will fall 
less than if they were, all else equal. 
44
 The current global economic slowdown led to a sharp reduction in U.S.-China trade in 2009; both U.S. exports to and 
imports from China fell sharply, though imports fell at a bigger rate. As a result, the U.S. trade deficit with China was 
down 14.8% over the previous year. 
45
 Depending on the elasticity of demand for the product, some might be willing to pay the extra price and buy the same 
level as before, some might buy less of the product, and some might stop purchasing the product altogether. 
46
 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Import/Export Price Indexes, Press Release, various issues. 
47
 Some of the costs may have been borne by Chinese producers or workers. Alternatively, China might have been able 
to boost efficiency, thus lowering costs, or production could have moved inland where labor is cheaper. 
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China’s Role in the Global Supply Chain 
The issue of exchange rate effects is further complicated by China’s role as a major assembly 
center for multinational corporations. Many analysts contend that the sharp increase in U.S. 
imports from China over the past several years (and hence the growing bilateral trade imbalance) 
is largely the result of movement in production facilities from other (primarily Asian) countries to 
China. That is, various products that used to be assembled in such places as Japan, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, etc., and then exported to the United States are now being made in China (in many cases, 
by U.S. and other foreign firms in China) and exported to the United States. According to Chinese 
data, foreign-invested firms in China account for over half of China’s trade flows (both exports 
and imports). Such firms import raw materials, intermediate goods (such as components), and 
production machinery to China. One study of Apple Inc.’s iPod found that the product itself was 
assembled in China in factories owned by a Taiwanese company from components that were 
produced by numerous multinational corporations. The level of value added by Chinese workers 
who assembled the iPod in China was estimated to be small relative to the total cost of producing 
each unit (about 3%), and much smaller relative to the retail price of the unit sold in the United 
States.48 Some analysts contend that, because of the high level of imported inputs that comprise a 
large share of China’s exports, an appreciated RMB would have little effect on the prices of 
Chinese exports, and hence have little effect on bilateral trade flows. Others contend that, even if 
foreign-invested firms in China faced significantly higher costs because of an appreciated RMB, 
they would move production to another low-cost country, and thus, while the U.S trade deficit 
with China decreased, the U.S. trade deficit with other countries would increase. 
Underlying Macroeconomic Imbalances Are Unlikely to Disappear 
By accounting identity, the overall trade deficit is equal to the shortfall between domestic saving 
and investment, while an overall trade surplus is equal to a surplus of domestic saving relative to 
investment. For many years, China has been a high-saving country that has run overall trade 
surpluses and the United States has been a low-saving country that has run overall trade deficits 
(see Appendix). China’s use of an exchange rate peg and capital controls may have contributed to 
its high saving rate, but it is unlikely that movement to a floating exchange rate would eliminate 
the large disparity between U.S. and Chinese saving rates. Thus, it is likely that the U.S. would 
continue to be a net debtor and China would continue to be a net creditor if the RMB rose in 
value. If so, economic theory predicts the countries’ bilateral trade imbalance would either persist 
or possibly be replaced by new bilateral imbalances with third countries. 
Differing Opinions on Making RMB Appreciation a Top U.S. Trade Priority 
As noted earlier, a number of U.S. economists have argued that China’s undervalued currency has 
negatively affected the U.S. and global economies. However, other economists contend that, 
while an undervalued RMB may have distorted trade flows to some extent, it is not the most 
significant challenge to U.S. economic interests vis-à-vis China, and therefore, they argue, an 
appreciation of the currency by itself would do little to boost the U.S. economy. For example, 
48
 Communications of the ACM, Who Captures Value in a Global Innovation Network? The Case of Apple’s iPod, 
March 2009. 
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• Derek Scissors at the Heritage Foundation contends that appreciation of the RMB 
would have little impact on U.S. employment, stating it would create “a few 
thousand jobs at best.”49 He argues that the Chinese government’s extensive use 
of industrial policies, namely subsidies and regulatory protection (such as state-
sponsored monopolies) sharply limits imports of goods and services that compete 
with the state sector, which would remain unaffected even if the RMB was 
appreciated. He notes: “Guaranteed revenue and economies of scale make state 
firms modestly competitive as exporters when they would otherwise be 
uncompetitive. The real harm, however, is to imports of goods and services from 
the U.S. The degree of state predominance caps the total share available to all 
domestic private and foreign companies, leaving American producers in a vicious 
battle for permanently minor market segments. This is a far more stringent 
limitation than an undervalued currency.” 50 
• Michael Pettis with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace makes a 
similar argument except that he contends that Chinese government “financial 
repression” policies have kept real returns to deposits low (and sometimes 
negative) in China in order to keep real lending rates artificially low (since they 
are set by the government, not market conditions) for Chinese firms (especially 
state-owned firms). He states that this constitutes a forced transfer of income 
from Chinese households to Chinese producers, which has led to over-investment 
and over-capacity by Chinese firms, with much of that excess capacity being 
exported. Pettis concludes that “as long as China continues to subsidize its 
production growth at the expense of household income, it will have difficulty 
increasing domestic demand and cutting its reliance on exports.”51 
Winners and Losers of RMB Appreciation from an Economic 
Perspective 
Economists generally oppose the use of polices (such as subsidies and trade protection) that 
interrupt market forces and distort the most efficient distribution of resources. A fixed or managed 
float exchange rate whose level is not adjusted when economic conditions change might be 
viewed as a such a distortion.52 Thus, from an economist’s perspective, adopting a more market-
based currency would be a win-win situation for China, the United States, and the global 
economy as a whole, in the sense that it would lead to a more efficient allocation of resources in 
both countries (though not necessarily any effect on overall employment levels, as discussed 
below). From a policy perspective, it could be argued that China’s current undervalued currency 
produces economic “winners and losers” in both countries, and therefore, an adjustment to that 
policy would produce a new set of economic “winners and losers.” Although numerous factors 
49
 He also argues that reducing the Federal budget deficit in the long run is the best way to boost employment and states 
that “in comparative importance, the value of the RMB is a footnote. 
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 Heritage Foundation, WebMemo, Deadlines and Delays: Chinese Revaluation Will Still Not Bring American Jobs, 
April 6, 2010. 
51
 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, How Can China Reduce Its Reliance on Net Exports? June 24, 2010. 
52
 The standard economic model for determining whether countries should have a floating exchange rate is the “optimal 
currency area” model. According to this model, two countries can gain from fixed exchange rates if their goods and 
labor markets are highly interconnected and their business cycles are closely synchronized. By these criteria, China and 
the United States are unlikely to form an optimal currency area. 
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affect global economic growth and trade flows, let us assume that an appreciation of the RMB 
produces a significant change in trade. What would the effects be for the U.S. economy? 
Effect on U.S Exporters and Import-Competitors 
When exchange rate policy causes the RMB to be less expensive than it would be if it were 
determined by supply and demand, it causes Chinese exports to be relatively inexpensive and 
U.S. exports to China to be relatively expensive. As a result, U.S. exports and the production of 
U.S. goods and services that compete with Chinese imports fall, in the short run.53 Many of the 
affected firms are in the manufacturing sector.54 This causes the trade deficit to rise and reduces 
aggregate demand in the short run, all else equal. A market-based exchange rate could boost U.S. 
exports and provide some relief to U.S. firms that directly compete with Chinese firms. 
Effect on U.S. Consumers and Certain Producers 
According to economic theory, a society’s economic well-being is usually measured not by how 
much it can produce, but how much it can consume. An undervalued RMB that lowers the price 
of imports from China allows the United States to increase its consumption through an 
improvement in the terms-of-trade. Since changes in aggregate spending are only temporary, from 
a long-term perspective, the lasting effect of an undervalued RMB is to increase the purchasing 
power of U.S. consumers. Imports from China are not limited to consumption goods. U.S. firms 
also import capital equipment and inputs from China to produce finished goods. An undervalued 
RMB lowers the price of these U.S. products, increasing their output, and thus making such firms 
more internationally competitive. An appreciation of China’s currency could raise prices for U.S. 
consumers, lowering their economic welfare, meaning they have less money to spend on other 
goods and services. In addition, firms that use imported Chinese parts could face higher costs, 
making them relatively less competitive. 
Effect on U.S. Borrowers 
An undervalued RMB also has an effect on U.S. borrowers. When the United States runs a 
current account deficit with China, an equivalent amount of capital flows from China to the 
United States, as can be seen in the U.S. balance of payments accounts. This occurs because the 
Chinese central bank or private Chinese citizens are investing in U.S. assets, which allows more 
U.S. capital investment in plant and equipment to take place than would otherwise occur. Capital 
investment increases because the greater demand for U.S. assets puts downward pressure on U.S. 
interest rates, and firms are now willing to make investments that were previously unprofitable. 
This increases aggregate spending in the short run, all else equal, and also increases the size of 
the economy in the long run by increasing the capital stock. The effect on interest rates is likely to 
53
 Many such firms contend that China’s currency policy constitutes one of several unfair trade advantages enjoyed by 
Chinese firms, including low wages, lack of enforcement of safety and environmental standards, selling below cost 
(dumping) and direct assistance from the Chinese government. 
54U.S. employment in manufacturing as a share of total non-agricultural employment fell from 31.8% in 1960, to 22.4% 
in 1980, to 13.1% in 2000, to 9.1% in December 2009. This trend is much larger than the Chinese currency issue and is 
caused by numerous other factors, including productivity gains in manufacturing and the rise of employment in the 
service sector. 
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be greater during periods of robust economic growth, when investment demand is strong, than 
when the economy is weak. 
Private firms are not the only beneficiaries of the lower interest rates caused by the capital inflow 
(trade deficit) from China. Interest-sensitive household spending, on goods such as consumer 
durables and housing, is also higher than it would be if capital from China did not flow into the 
United States. In addition, a large proportion of the U.S. assets bought by the Chinese, 
particularly by the central bank, are U.S. Treasury securities, which fund U.S. federal budget 
deficits. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, China held $902 billion in U.S. Treasury 
securities as of April 2010, making it the largest foreign holder of such securities and accounting 
for 23% of total foreign holdings. The U.S. federal budget deficit has increased rapidly since 
FY2008, causing a sharp increase in the amount of Treasury securities that must be sold. While 
the Obama Administration has pushed China to appreciate its currency, it has also encouraged it 
to continue to purchase U.S. securities. Some analysts contend that, although an appreciation of 
China’s currency could help boost U.S. exports to China, it could also lessen China’s need to buy 
U.S. Treasury securities, which could push up U.S. interest rates. In the unlikely worst case 
scenario, if China stopped buying Treasury securities at a time when the U.S. budget deficit is 
unusually high, it could destabilize financial markets by throwing into doubt the U.S. 
government’s ability to sustain its current fiscal policy. 
Net Effect on the U.S. Economy 
In the medium run, according to economic theory, an undervalued RMB neither increases nor 
decreases aggregate demand in the United States. Rather, it leads to a compositional shift in U.S. 
production, away from U.S. exporters and import-competing firms toward the firms that benefit 
from Chinese capital flows. Thus, it is expected to have no medium- or long-run effect on 
aggregate U.S. employment or unemployment. As evidence, one can consider that the since the 
1980s, the U.S. trade deficit has tended to rise when unemployment was falling and fall when 
unemployment is rising. For example, the current account deficit peaked at 6% of GDP in 2006, 
when the unemployment rate was 4.6%, and fell to 3% of GDP in 2009, when the unemployment 
rate was 9.3%. 
However, the gains and losses in employment and production caused by the trade deficit will not 
be dispersed evenly across regions and sectors of the economy: on balance, some areas will gain 
while others will lose. And by shifting the composition of U.S. output to a higher capital base, the 
size of the economy would be larger in the long run as a result of the capital inflow/trade deficit 
(although the returns from foreign-financed capital will not flow to Americans). 
Although the compositional shift in output has no negative effect on aggregate U.S. output and 
employment in the long run, there may be adverse short-run consequences. If U.S. output in the 
trade sector falls more quickly than the increases in output of U.S. recipients of Chinese capital, 
aggregate U.S. spending and employment could temporarily fall. This is more likely to be a 
concern if the economy is already sluggish than if it is at full employment. Otherwise, it is likely 
that government macroeconomic policy adjustment and market forces can compensate for any 
decline of output in the trade sector by expanding other elements of aggregate demand. The U.S. 
trade deficit with China (or with the world as a whole) has not prevented the U.S. economy from 
registering high rates of growth in the past. 
A Yale University study estimated that a 25% appreciation of the RMB would initially decrease 
U.S. imports from China and lead to greater domestic production in the United States and 
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increased exports to China. However, the study estimated that benefits to the U.S. economy 
would be offset by lower Chinese economic growth (because of falling exports), which would 
diminish its demand for imports, including those from the United States. In addition, the RMB 
appreciation would increase U.S. costs for imported products from China (decreasing real wealth 
and real wages), and cause higher U.S. short-term interest rates. As a result, the sum effect of the 
25% RMB appreciation was estimated to a negative effect on U.S. aggregate demand and output 
and result in a loss of 57,100 U.S. jobs—less than one-tenth of 1% of total U.S. employment.55 
The Effects of an Undervalued RMB on China’s Economy 
If the RMB is undervalued vis-à-vis the dollar, then Chinese exports to the United States are 
likely cheaper than they would be if the currency were freely traded, providing a boost to China’s 
export industries, and helping to make it the world’s largest merchandise exporter. Eliminating 
exchange rate risk through a managed peg also increases the attractiveness of China as a 
destination for foreign investment in export-oriented production facilities. However, there are a 
number of negative aspects to China’s export growth strategy and currency policy. 
• Overdependence on exporting (and fixed investment relating to exports) and FDI 
inflows made China particularly vulnerable to the effects of the global economic 
slowdown. Analysis by the IMF estimated that fixed investment related to 
tradable goods plus net exports together accounted for over 60% of China’s GDP 
growth from 2001 to 2008, (up from 40% from 1990 to 2000), which was 
significantly higher than in the G-7 countries (16%), the euro area (30%) and the 
rest of Asia (35%). GDP growth in China fell from 13% in 2007 to 8.7% in 2009, 
still one of the fastest growth rates in the world.56 
• An undervalued currency makes imports more expensive, hurting Chinese firms 
that import parts, machinery, and raw materials. Such a policy, in effect, benefits 
Chinese exporting firms (many of which are owned by foreign multinational 
corporations) at the expense of non-exporting Chinese firms. This may impede 
the most efficient allocation of resources in the Chinese economy. Resources that 
might go to other sectors, such as the service sector, are diverted to the export 
sector. 
• If one considers an undervalued currency as a form of export subsidy, then 
China, in effect, is subsidizing American living standards by selling products that 
are cheaper than they would be under market conditions. This in effect lowers 
China’s terms of trade—the level of imports that can be obtained through 
exports. Chinese citizens on the other hand pay more for tradable goods, not only 
because imported goods are more expensive because of the de facto tariff an 
undervalued currency entails, but also because domestic competition is restricted 
as well. Rather than use its trade surpluses to purchase goods and services from 
abroad, China is forced, because of its need to maintain its peg to the dollar, to 
put a large share of its foreign exchange holdings into U.S. debt securities, which 
earn a relatively low return. 
55 Fair, Ray C., “Estimated Macroeconomic Effects Of A Chinese Yuan Appreciation,” Cowles Foundation Discussion 
Paper 1755, March 2010. 
56
 Guo, Kai and Papa N’Diaye, Is China’s Export-Oriented Growth Sustainable, IMF Working Paper, August 2009. 
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• The use of a pegged system effectively limits the ability of the central 
government to use monetary policy to control inflation. If the government raised 
interest rates, “hot money” would flow to China from abroad, forcing the 
government to increase the money supply to buy up the foreign currency 
necessary to maintain the targeted peg, which has often lead to easy credit 
policies by the banks, resulting in overcapacity in a number of sectors, such as 
steel, and speculative asset bubbles, such as in real estate.57 As a result, the 
Chinese government has tried to use administrative controls, with limited results, 
to limit bank loans to sectors where overcapacity is believed to exist. 
Although a rebalancing of China’s economy, including the adoption of a market-based currency, 
would likely entail significant adjustment costs, it would also likely produce long-term benefits to 
the Chinese economy. For example it could: 
• boost China’s term of trade by increasing the level of imports that can be 
purchased by its exports; 
• increase economic efficiency (and hence economic growth), by re-directing 
resources away from inefficient (and often subsidized) sectors of the economy to 
those that are more efficient and competitive; 
• lower prices for imported goods and services and expose more of the domestic 
economy to greater global competition, thus lowering prices for consumers and 
improving Chinese living standards; 
• improve the efficiency and competiveness of many Chinese domestic firms 
(including those that produce only for the domestic market) by lowering prices 
for imported inputs, raw materials, and machinery, thus boosting their output; 
• expand the ability of the government to use monetary policies to control inflation 
and to allocate capital according to its most efficient use through a market-based 
credit system; 
• help alleviate the large disparities of economic development between the coastal 
regions of China (as well as growing income disparities throughout China) that 
have been driven in part by China’s export growth strategy and are viewed by 
many analysts as posing a potential risk to stability; 
• help reduce or eliminate a major source of tension between China and many of its 
trading partners, some of whom view China’s undervalued currency and its use 
of subsidies as beggar-thy-neighbor policies that promote economic development 
in China at the expense of growth in other countries. 
The great challenge for Chinese leaders, assuming that they are committed to greater economic 
reform and rebalancing the economy (and there is no clear evidence indicating whether or not 
they are), would be to quickly generate new sources of economic growth and job opportunities in 
order to offset the decline of those sectors that would no longer be able to compete once 
preferential government policies (such as subsidies and an undervalued currency) are eliminated. 
However, some analysts contend that this rebalancing could prove difficult for China politically 
and could take several years to achieve. For example, according to Michael Pettis, reforming 
57
 The government can and has attempted to sterilize the increase of the money supply by forcing state banks to buy 
and hold government bonds. 
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China’s economic policies would have to involve political reforms because “eliminating the 
mechanisms by which Chinese policymakers can transfer income from households to 
manufacturers will reduce their control over the commanding heights of the economy, and it will 
sharply reduce the power and leverage the ruling party has over business and local 
governments.”58 On the other hand, China’s economy has consistently generated annual growth 
rates near 10% in recent decades, making adjustment much easier. 
Policy Options for the RMB and Potential Outcomes 
If the Chinese were to allow their currency to float, it would be determined by private actors in 
the market based on the supply and demand for Chinese goods and assets relative to U.S. goods 
and assets. If the RMB appreciated as a result, this would boost U.S. exports and the output of 
U.S. producers who compete with the Chinese. The U.S. bilateral trade deficit would likely 
decline (but not necessarily disappear). At the same time, the Chinese central bank would no 
longer purchase U.S. assets to maintain the peg. U.S. borrowers, including the federal 
government, would now need to find new lenders to finance their borrowing, and interest rates in 
the United States would rise. This would reduce spending on interest-sensitive purchases, such as 
capital investment, housing (residential investment), and consumer durables. The reduction in 
investment spending would reduce the long-run size of the U.S. capital stock, and thereby the 
U.S. economy. In the present context of a large budget deficit, some analysts fear that a sudden 
decline in Chinese demand for U.S. assets (because China was no longer purchasing assets to 
influence the exchange rate) could lead to a drop in the value of the dollar that could potentially 
destabilize the U.S. economy.59 
If the relative demand for Chinese goods and assets were to fall at some point in the future, the 
floating exchange rate would depreciate, and the effects would be reversed. Floating exchange 
rates fluctuate in value frequently and significantly.60 
A move to a floating exchange rate is typically accompanied by the elimination of capital controls 
that limit a country’s private citizens from freely purchasing and selling foreign currency. The 
Chinese government maintains capital controls (and arguably one of the major reasons China 
opposes a floating exchange rate) because it fears a large private capital outflow would result if 
such controls were removed. This might occur because Chinese citizens fear that their deposits in 
the potentially insolvent state banking system are unsafe. If the capital outflow were large 
enough, a banking crisis in China could result and could cause the floating exchange rate to 
depreciate rather than appreciate.61 If this occurred, the output of U.S. exporters and import-
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competing firms would be reduced below the prevailing level, and the U.S. bilateral trade deficit 
would likely expand. In other words, the United States would still borrow heavily from China, but 
it would now be private citizens buying U.S. assets instead of the Chinese central bank. China 
could attempt to float its exchange rate while maintaining its capital controls, at least temporarily. 
This solution would eliminate the possibility that the currency would depreciate because of a 
private capital outflow. While this would be unusual, it might be possible. It would likely make it 
more difficult to impose effective capital controls, however, since the fluctuating currency would 
offer a much greater profit incentive for evasion. 
Another possibility is for China to maintain the status quo. Even without adjustment to the 
nominal exchange rate, over time the real rate would adjust as inflation rates in the two countries 
diverged. The Chinese central bank acquires foreign reserves by printing yuan to finance its trade 
surplus. As the central bank exchanged newly printed yuan for U.S. assets, prices in China would 
rise along with the money supply until the real exchange rate was brought back into line with the 
market rate.62 This would cause the U.S. bilateral trade deficit to decline and expand the output of 
U.S. exporters and import-competing firms. This real exchange rate adjustment would only occur 
over time, however, and pressures on the U.S. trade sector would persist in the meantime. 
None of the solutions guarantee that the bilateral trade deficit will be eliminated. China is a 
country with a high saving rate, and the United States is a country with a low saving rate; it is not 
surprising that their overall trade balances would be in surplus and deficit, respectively. As the 
Appendix discusses, many economists believe that these trade imbalances will persist as long as 
underlying macroeconomic imbalances persist. At the bilateral level, it is not unusual for two 
countries to run persistently imbalanced trade, even with a floating exchange rate. If China can 
continue its combination of low-cost labor and rapid productivity gains, which have been 
reducing export prices in yuan terms, its exports to the United States are likely to continue to 
grow regardless of the exchange rate regime, as evidenced by the 21% appreciation of the RMB 
from 2005 to 2008 which did not lead to any reduction in the trade deficit over that period. 
(...continued) 
Financial Times, August 26, 2003. Alternatively, if Chinese citizens proved unconcerned about keeping their wealth in 
Chinese assets, the removal of capital controls could lead to a greater inflow of foreign capital since foreigners would 
be less concerned about being unable to access their Chinese investments. This would cause the exchange rate to 
appreciate. 
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 To some extent, China can reduce the effects of the accumulation of foreign reserves on the money supply through 
credit controls, although this is unlikely to be completely effective. 
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Appendix. Indicators of U.S. and Chinese Economic 
Imbalances 
The issue of rebalancing economic growth by both the United States and China has been a central 
focus of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) talks held in July 2009 and 
May 2010. Secretary of Treasury Timothy Geithner stated at the July 2009 S&ED that: 
“Recognizing that cooperation between China and the United States will remain vital not only to 
the well being of our two nations but also the health of the global economy, we agreed to 
undertake policies to bring about sustainable, balanced global growth once economic recovery is 
firmly in place.” 
The global financial crisis and subsequent GDP decline among many countries have resulted in 
new scrutiny by many economists of “global imbalances,” namely the disparities in savings and 
investment levels among various countries (i.e., some countries save too little and some too much 
relative to their investment needs), and subsequent current account imbalances that have resulted 
(i.e., countries where domestic savings exceed investment run trade surpluses and countries 
where domestic investment exceeds saving run current account deficits). China and the United 
States are not unique in having these imbalances—Japan, Germany, and other East Asian 
countries are other examples of high savers, while southern and eastern European countries are 
other examples of high borrowers. Nevertheless, the United States and China have come under 
particular scrutiny because of their relative overall size (they are projected to be the two largest 
economies in the world in 2010) and the relative size of their saving, investment, and trade 
imbalances. Some analysts also claim that China’s exchange rate policy is preventing other East 
Asian countries from adjusting, because those countries are unwilling allowing their currencies to 
appreciate and lose export market share to China unless the RMB appreciates too. 
Many economists contend such imbalances were a major cause of the current global economic 
slowdown. For example, high savers, such as China, loaned their money to low savers, such as 
the United States, which helped keep real U.S. interest rates low and contributed to the bubble in 
the U.S. housing market and subsequent financial crisis. Many of the high savings countries 
(especially those in Asia) heavily relied on exporting as a source of their economic growth and 
thus were significantly impacted when global demand for imports sharply fell.63 As a result, many 
economists have called for economic restructuring among many of the world’s major economies, 
especially the United States and China. Fundamental restructuring of this sort would take time, 
and if not well coordinated, could deepen the global output gap in the short run. For example, if 
low saving countries attempt to increase their saving rate (e.g., by reducing their government 
budget deficits) at a time of high unemployment, and high saving countries do not simultaneously 
increase their consumption, then worldwide demand could decline and cause unemployment to 
rise further in the short run. 
This section provides an overview of some of the unique differences between the economies of 
the United States and China that have played a role in global imbalances. 
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Current Account Balances, Savings, and Investment 
The level of U.S. gross savings is far below total U.S. investment, indicating that the U.S. must 
borrow capital abroad to meet its investment needs. By definition, domestic savings minus gross 
investment (from domestic and foreign sources) equals the current account balance.64 Nations that 
do not save enough to meet domestic investment needs run current account deficits and those that 
save more than they need for domestic investment run current account surpluses.65 In 2008, the 
ratio of U.S. gross domestic savings to gross investment in 2008 was 66.9%, the lowest among 
the world’s major economies. On the other hand, the ratio for China was 122.2% (see Tab le A - 1 ). 
Table A-1. Ratio of Gross National Savings to Gross Investment and Current 
Account Balances as a Percent of GDP for Various Economies: 2008 
United States 
Italy 
Australia 
France 
United Kingdom 
Brazil 
India 
Mexico 
South Korea 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
Canada 
Japan 
China 
Russia 
Taiwan 
Germany 
Singapore 
Malaysia 
Gross National Savings/Gross 
Investment (%) 
66.9 
84.1 
84.6 
89.8 
91.0 
91.5 
93.1 
94.5 
95.2 
99.9 
100.4 
102.2 
113.6 
122.2 
124.2 
127.5 
134.5 
163.9 
191.8 
Current Account Balance/GDP 
(%) 
-4.9 
-3.4 
-4.6 
-2.2 
-1.5 
-1.5 
-2.4 
-1.5 
-0.7 
0.0 
0.1 
0.5 
3.2 
9.6 
6.2 
6.2 
6.6 
14.4 
17.6 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Note: The current account data for most of the countries changed significantly in 2009 as a result of the global 
financial crisis. 
64
 The current account balance is the broadest measurement of a country’s financial flows. It includes the balances for 
trade in goods and services, net income (investment income and compensation for overseas workers), and net unilateral 
transfers. 
65
 A current account deficit also reflects that a country consumes more than it produces, while a current account surplus 
indicates that a countries produces more than it consumes. 
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In nominal dollar terms, the United States had the world’s largest current account deficit at $706 
billion in 2008, while China had the largest current account surplus at $426 billion (see Figure A-
1 ).66 These balances were also significant as a share of GDP: 9.6% for China and -4.9% for the 
United States (see Figure A-2).67 
Figure A-1. Chinese and U.S. Current Account Balances: 2000-2009 
$billions 
Source: Global Insight. 
66
 The U.S. current account deficit, and China’s current account surplus, both fell in 2009 as a result of the global 
economic slowdown. 
67
 The U.S. current account deficit as a percent of GDP fell in 2008 and 2009. China’s current account surplus as a 
percent of GDP fell each year from 2007 to 2009. 
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Figure A-2. Chinese and U.S. Current Account Balances as a Percent of GDP: 
2000-2009 
(%) 
Source: Global Insight. 
Gross savings are the total level of domestic savings, including private, corporate, and 
government. Savings represents income that is not consumed. Physical investment spending on 
plant and equipment can be financed from domestic or foreign savings. Over the past several 
years, the United States has maintained one of the lowest gross savings rates (i.e., total national 
savings as a percent of GDP) among developed countries, while China has maintained one of the 
world’s highest national savings rates. From 1990 to 2009, U.S. gross national savings as a 
percent of GDP declined from 13.5% to 8.7%, while China’s rose from 37.8% to 50.5% (see 
Figure A-3). 
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Figure A-3. Gross National Savings as a Percent of GDP for China and the United 
States: 1990-2009 
(% ) 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Notes: Aggregate national savings by the public and private sector as a percentage of nominal GDP. 
Some “rebalancing” has taken place during the global recession. The U.S. current account deficit 
has declined from 6% to 3% of GDP between 2006 and 2009. It has fallen because domestic 
investment spending has fallen and the private saving rate has risen from 14% of GDP in 2007 to 
17% of GDP in 2009. On the other hand, this rebalancing has been partly offset by the increase in 
the U.S. budget deficit from 1.2% of GDP in 2007 to 9.9% of GDP in 2009, which directly 
reduces national saving. What remains to be seen is how much of this rebalancing is cyclical, and 
will be reversed when the U.S. economy improves, and how much of it is permanent. China’s 
current account surplus fell from 10.8% of GDP in 2007 to 5.8% of GDP in 2009. 
Despite the rebalancing that has already taken place, some economists would not consider either 
country to have reached a position that is sustainable in the long run. Before the late 1990s, the 
United States had never had a current account deficit of 3% of GDP. And even with China’s 
reduced current account surplus, and the diminished U.S. current account deficit over the past few 
years, China’s net holdings of foreign assets and the U.S. net foreign debt continue to grow. 
Likewise, the decline in China’s current account surplus was caused by a more rapid decline in 
China’s exports than imports during the worldwide economic downturn—when worldwide 
growth picks up again and reaches pre-crisis levels, that trend could reverse. Global demand for 
Chinese products (despite economic slowdowns in many countries) has increased sharply over the 
past few months. 
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Sources of Economic Growth 
Figure A-4 and Figure A-5 indicate sources of real GDP growth for the United States and China 
from 2003-2009. From 2003 to 2007, the largest source of U.S. GDP growth was private 
consumption. In 2008 and 2009, changes in external balances (i.e., net exports) were the fastest 
growing sector of the U.S. economy. For China, gross fixed investment (much of it linked to 
tradable sectors for most years) was the largest contributor to its GDP growth from 2003-2009. In 
2009, changes to net exports in China were a drag on the Chinese economy. 
Figure A-4. U.S. Real GDP Growth and Sources of GDP Growth: 2003-2009 
(% and % Points) 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
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Figure A-5. Chinese Real GDP Growth and Sources of GDP Growth 
(% and % Points) 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Investment and Consumption Relative to GDP 
As indicated in Figure A-6, China’s gross investment as a percent of GDP in 2008 was the 
highest of any major economy at 43.5% in 2008, up from 34.3% in 2000. In comparison, the U.S. 
total in 2008 was 14.8%, the lowest among the countries listed. Conversely, as indicated in 
Figure A-7, China had one of the lowest rates of private consumption among major economies at 
35.5%, which was down from 46.5% in 2000. In comparison U.S. private consumption as a share 
of GDP in 2008 was 70.1%, among the highest of major economies. 
Although the level of Chinese private consumption is small relative to GDP, it is rapidly growing. 
From 2000 to 2009, real Chinese private consumption grew at an average annual rate of 7.1%, 
which was much faster than the growth in real U.S. private consumption, but slower than the 
overall growth rate of the economy (see Figure A-8). 
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Figure A-6. Gross Investment as a Percent of GDP for Selected Economies: 2008 
(%) 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Figure A-7. Private Consumption as a Percent of GDP for Selected Economies: 2008 
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
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Figure A-8.Annual Growth in Real Chinese and U.S. Private Consumption: 
2000-2009 
% Increase over the previous year 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
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